Africa's Involvement in the Trade of Water

China has rapidly diminishing supplies of irrigable water and arable land as well as an ever increasing population size who are demanding (and will demand) more access to meat and exotic fruits. As a result, China is not self-sufficient in food production and is seeking solutions to increasing its food security outside of its borders. My last post investigated the extent to which China is seeking solutions to its food security issues by investing in the agricultural sector of Africa.

It concluded that, contrary to popular belief, the Chinese government does not have a coordinated programme aimed specifically at acquiring African agricultural land to grow food for export. In fact, the majority of Chinese investment is focused upon capacity building to foster a more productive and efficient African agricultural sector. Additionally, and in contrast to popular opinion, China relies very little upon Africa for supplies of agricultural commodites. Whilst in fact, many African countries rely upon Chinese imports for cereals and grains (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013). Be it China or Eritrea, the idea of importing foodstuffs due to a lack of domestic self-sufficiency leads me to think about the concept of virtual water. This post will explore the concept of virtual water and examine why it is important to both African nations and the global community alike.

Virtual water is defined as the volume of water needed to produce an agricultural commodity, measured at the place where the product was produced (Allan, 2003). Consequently, that volume of water becomes ‘embedded’ in the product it produced and the water is effectively traded alongside it. In order to fully understand the importance of virtual water trade it also crucial to understand the concept of water footprints. Hoekstra and Mekonnen define the national water footprint as a countries consumptive use of green water (soil water), blue water (river, lake) and grey water (wastewater). This includes general consumption of water within the territory, water used within the territory to produce export products and water used in other countries to produce imported products (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2012).

Therefore, the greater a countries water footprint, the greater their consumption of water. For countries that have a large water footprint and are water scarce, many have externalised their water footprint via virtual water. This reduces the use of state water resources in turn preventing water crises or deficits within their territory (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2012). For example, 1000 litres of water are required to produce 1kg of wheat. The capacity to import this wheat avoids the economic and political stresses associated with accessing 1000 litres of water, in turn avoiding a potential water deficit and associated difficulties (Allan, 2003).

Source: http://virtualwater.eu/

Thus, virtual water allows for international trade of water from ‘water-rich’ to ‘water-poor’ countries. However, it also means that countries which have largely externalised their water footprint are highly dependent not only on imports of food but also the freshwater resources of other countries (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2012). Countries that have a large external water (and food) dependency include:  Malta (92% dependency), Kuwait (90%), Israel (82%) (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2012). This dependency creates new forms of political and economic interactions and relations between countries. In addition, the relatively large volume of international virtual water flows and associated external water dependencies strengthens the argument that issues surrounding water scarcity must no longer be considered a domestic problem but a global one (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2012).

When virtual water trade is quantified and spatially analysed it becomes apparent that the commodity flows from ‘water-rich’ to ‘water-poor’ countries. However, not all countries with a large external water footprint (and therefore rely heavily on virtual water imports) are water scarce. To highlight this Hoekstra and Mekonnen use the example of many Northern European countries e.g. the UK. The UK has an external water footprint of 60-95% thus it depends highly upon external freshwater resources. However, this is not by necessity because the UK has a temperate climate, fertile soils and ample capacity to expand agricultural production and therefore reduce their external water dependency (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2012). Thus, in reality, virtual water often flows from ‘cash-poor’ to ‘cash-rich countries’.

According to Hoekstra and Mekonnen, countries such as Chad, Ethiopia, Niger and Mali have external water dependencies of less than 4%. Given that the UK has more than sufficient water supplies but an external dependency of 60-95% it seems a paradox that many of Africa’s most water-stressed countries have some of the smallest external water footprints. This can be seen in figure 2 where the whole of Sub Saharan Africa has a net negative virtual water balance i.e. their exports of virtual water are greater than their imports of virtual water (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2012).

Source: Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2012

As has been mentioned in previous posts, Africa has been identified as possessing huge untapped agricultural potential. As a consequence, the continent has been the focus of significant investment by a diverse range of international actors aspiring to increase agricultural productivity and make the continent a net agricultural exporter. I now return to the involvement of China in Africa's agricultural sector. China claims that the motivation for their campaign of investment in African agricultural development and African land is for the future of global food security and not merely their own. Given that China's water footprint of consumption is still relatively small these claims could be true (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2012). However, China's growing population, water stress and demand for meat it is likely to increase the export of virtual water in to the country. As this reliance increases I predict that China will exploit it's sphere of influence in Africa to ensure that the continent aids China in meeting its population's food needs. Given Africa's water scarcity issues (and the fact that these are likely to be further exacerbated by climate change) the agricultural development of the continent will need to proceed with caution if the future viability water supplies on the continent are to be safeguarded. 

Allan, J. (2003). Virtual Water - the Water, Food, and Trade Nexus. Useful Concept or Misleading Metaphor?. Water International, 28(1), pp.106-113.

Hoekstra, A. and Mekonnen, M. (2012). The Water Footprint of Humanity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(9), pp.3232-3237.

Will Africa Feed China?

My previous post touched on foreign investment and involvement in the development of Africa’s agricultural sector. In that post it was the case of the significant investments being made by China and the European Union’s to increase Africa’s water storage capacity. With colonialism being an intrinsic part of Africa’s history I wondered whether China’s investment and involvement in Africa is merely a contemporary neo-colonialism, replicating previous patterns of extraction and exploitation, or whether in fact it represents a new paradigm of development (Scoones et. al., 2016). The topic of Chinese land-buying in Africa as a means of achieving Chinese food security has received particular attention in Western media. In this post I will explore to what extent China is investing in Africa’s agricultural industry and whether or not Africa will feed China.

In the first two decades of the 21^st century China (along with Brazil, Russia and India) emerged as a global investor and trader, particularly in agricultural investment (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013). China’s rapidly growing economy and even faster growing middle-class means that demand for meat and exotic foods will only increase, necessitating more imports. As well, China houses 22% of the world’s population but has only 7% of the world’s arable land. The country has diminishing irrigable water and arable land supplies due to urban expansion, deforestation and desertification; it is estimated that between 1996 and 2006 China lost almost 9 million hectares of farmland (Horta, 2014), (Cheru and Modi, 2013), (Cassell, 2013).

Given China’s inevitable future increases in demand for food, decreasing agricultural capacity and the huge agricultural potential of Africa it doesn’t seem unreasonable to assume that China may look to Africa to secure large areas of arable land to ensure their own food security. This context combined with Chinas emergence as a global investor captured the attention of Western media and lead to a wealth of publications portraying China in neo-colonial pursuit of large areas of agricultural land to ensure their own food security. This image of China became cemented in the public’s mind (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013).

However, Deborah Bräutigam argues that the perception of China’s ambitions for China are a result of poor journalism, Western narratives of African victimisation and the Chinese themselves for exaggerating their ambitions for Africa (Olander and van Staden, 2016). She has also extensively demonstrated that there is a lack of evidence to support the public perception that China is on a mission of “large-scale land acquisition” in Africa nor are there any known Chinese land acquistions in Africa that exceed 50,000 hectares (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013). Indeed, the Chinese government is attempting to encourage Chinese agri-business companies to invest in African agriculture (Cassell, 2013). However, these incentives are often part of larger programmes promoting investment across a number of sectors. But, importantly, and contrary to what has been publicised in Western media, China does not have a coordinated strategy or programme specifically aimed at obtaining land in Africa to grow food for export (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013). Therefore, acquisition of African land by some Chinese agribusiness companies merely reflects China’s ‘going global’ attitude toward trade and foreign investment (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013).

As well, China’s Ministry of Commerce maintains a database of Chinese companies’ approved overseas investment proposals for Africa. Of the 2372 approved proposals only 86 were explicitly intended for farming (i.e. production of grains, cash crops or animal husbandry). Therefore, the amount of Chinese companies that are interested in investing in African agriculture is small compared to the interest in investing in other sectors of Africa (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013). In addition, not all approved proposals come to fruition and the investments that are being made are relatively small and certainly smaller than is reported by the media.

It seems strange that despite great interest there has not been any considerable investment in the African agricultural sector. Bräutigam claims that poor infrastructure and government inefficiency (and corruption in some cases) which exists in most land-rich African countries is to blame. When comparing Africa’s infrastructure and government inefficiency to that of Southeast Asia’s, where traditionally Chinese agricultural investment is targeted, Chinese businesses perceive the situation to be significantly worse in Africa thus deterring investment (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013).

Despite the low level of Chinese business investment in African agriculture, China has been involved in agriculture on the continent since the 1960’s. This is largely because China’s foreign aid programmes in Africa have always placed emphasis on agriculture (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013). China’s engagement in Africa’s agricultural sector has focused on capacity building through agricultural technology transfer, training and establishment of agricultural demonstration farms (Cassell, 2013). By 2009, 200 demonstration farms, 11 agricultural research stations and 60 agricultural investment projects had been established (Cassell, 2013).

Nanga-Eboko Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre, Cameroon
Source: http://china.aiddata.org/projects/31719

Cassell actually claims that China’s engagement with Africa has done more to support African agricultural development and alleviate poverty than any previous attempts by western actors (Cassell, 2013). Scoones et. al. compare the Chinese and western approaches to involvement in African agriculture. He claims that Western donors primarily focus upon large scale business investment i.e. only one intervention type. In contrast, Chinese interventions are based on experimentation, adaptation, revision and continuous learning. As well, as being far more numerous and diverse. Chinese engagement is therefore long-term and starkly contrasting with Western run short-term projects and with stringent monitoring and evaluation (Scoones et. al, 2016).

Female farmers at Nanga-Eboko centre receiving training on how to use weeders on their farms.
Source: http://climatereporters.com

China’s manner of engagement with the African agricultural sector suggests the possibly of a new paradigm of development cooperation i.e. South-South has been established (Scoones et. al, 2016). Despite claims by China that its investment in Africa’s agricultural sector are for the interests of global food security only time will tell if this is a form of Chinese neo-colonialism or whether it is a genuine attempt to facilitate development in Africa.

Nevertheless, for the mean time, China claims it is not attempting to support African agriculture in order to export food back to China (Cassell, 2013). However, this isn’t to say Africa isn’t China’s long-term plan. If long-term Chinese investments continue African agriculture could permanently transform. Investment has the potential to reduce poverty and hunger in Africa whilst also helping achieve global food security. Whilst China is willing Africa needs to seize this opportunity because it could result in Africa feeding the future China (and the world)….

Bräutigam, D. and Zhang, H. (2013). Green Dreams: Myth and Reality in China’s Agricultural Investment in Africa. Third World Quarterly, 34(9), pp.1676-1696.

Cheru, F. and Modi, R. (2013). Agricultural Development and Food Security in Africa. 1st ed. London: Zed Books, pp.173-189.

Horta, L. (2014). Chinese Agriculture Goes Global. Yaleglobal.yale.edu. Available at: http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/chinese-agriculture-goes-global

Olander, E. and van Staden, C. (2016). Why the Chinese Are Not on a Land-Buying Spree in Africa. The Huffington Post. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-olander/chinese-land-africa_b_10056780.html].

Scoones, I., Amanor, K., Favareto, A. and Qi, G. (2016). A New Politics of Development Cooperation? Chinese and Brazilian Engagements in African Agriculture. World Development, 81, pp.1-12.